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ABSTRACT
A new certification authority authorization (CAA) resource record for the domain
name system (DNS) was standardized in 2013. Motivated by the later 2017 deci-
sion to enforce mandatory CAA checking for most certificate authorities, this paper
surveys the early adoption of CAA by using an empirical sample collected from
the Alexa’s top-million domains. According to the results, (i) the adoption of CAA
is still at a modest level; only a little below two percent of the popular domains
sampled have adopted CAA. Among the domains that have adopted CAA, (ii) au-
thorizations dealing with wildcard certificates are rare compared to conventional
certificates. Interestingly, (iii) the results only partially reflect the market structure
of the global certificate business. With these timely results, the paper contributes
to the ongoing large-scale empirical research on the use of encryption technologies.
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1. Introduction
The CAA resource record (RR) passed formal standardization in 2013.1 It was only
four years later, in March 2017, when many certificate authorities (CAs) were man-
dated to implement CAA checking [14]. This decision was celebrated due to increasing
concerns about the issuance of fraudulent or rogue certificates in the global public key
infrastructure (PKI). Although CAA is only a small step toward better PKI security,
these concerns are a good way to briefly motivate the paper’s empirical survey on the
adoption and use of the new CAA resource record among popular Internet domains.
The transport layer security (TLS) and its predecessor, the secure sockets layer
(SSL), constitute the almost universally adopted cryptographic protocols for estab-
lishing communications security in the Internet and the world wide web in particular.
These protocols have largely also survived the test of time. While many revisions and
alterations have been required to patch the protocols, no cryptographic vulnerability
is known to exist that would allow to fully compromise the underlying end-to-end se-
curity model. This said, a number of high-profile TLS/SSL vulnerabilities (including
the so-called Heartbleed, FREAK, and DROWN) have been discovered and disclosed
1 This manuscript was submitted for double-blind peer review to Journal of Cyber Security Technology (ISSN:
2374-2917) in November 6, 2017. After this submission, two relevant papers have been published: [5] and [32].
A reader should consult these papers in addition to this manuscript.
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in recent years [25,34]. In addition to these vulnerabilities, a long-standing weakness
originates from the global PKI and its CA-based trust model [12,16]. This type of
a weakness is also what motivated the standardization and the later enforcement of
CAA checking among most certificate authorities.
The TLS protocol uses public-key cryptography for the initial exchange of keys. If
the exchange is successful, symmetric encryption is used afterwards. The PKI-induced
weakness exposes itself through server authentication. When a client connects to a
web server using TLS, the client’s web browser verifies the server’s certificate (key)
by evaluating it against a set of trusted certificates signed by trusted but still third-
party authorities. This evaluation places the trust provision entirely into the hands of
certificate authorities. In principle, a CA can sign a certificate for any domain, and
this certificate will be trusted by most web browsers and operating systems. There are
hundreds of CAs located in almost every corner of the world, and all of these CAs are
equally trusted [8]. What is more, the trust relationship is transitive: web browsers
and operating systems will trust certificates issued also by intermediate authorities [2].
These fundamental pillars of the global PKI allow to understand why it can be desir-
able to only trust some CAs and mistrust others. To put theoretical issues aside, there
have been two tangential real-world weaknesses in this trust model.
On one hand, the history knows many cases of erroneous signing of certificates by
CAs [23]. For instance, in 2001 two certificates were issued by VeriSign in Microsoft’s
name to an individual not affiliated with Microsoft [12]. While VeriSign sold its certifi-
cate business to Symantec later in 2010, controversies continued. For instance, recently
in March 2017, Google blamed Symantec for incorrectly issuing tens of thousands of
certificates [6]. A few months later, in August 2017, Symantec in turn sold its certifi-
cate business to DigiCert, but regardless of the ownership, the controversies are likely
to continue about the rigor (or lack thereof) that CAs use for certificate issuance.
On the other hand, the trust provision has exposed a more pressing concern about
the security of the CAs themselves. Any CA is a lucrative target for attacks. In addition
to limiting the availability of a CA through denial-of-service attacks [22], compromising
a CA opens numerous possibilities for tampering with confidentiality and integrity,
including issuance of rogue certificates, stealing or substituting keys used for signing,
and manipulating requests for issuing valid certificates for fraudulent purposes [13,17].
These scenarios are not only theoretical. The likely most well-known attack occurred in
2011 against the Dutch certificate authority DigiNotar, which later went also bankrupt
due to the attack. By compromising the CA, an attacker was able to issue a wildcard
certificate for Google’s main domain, which was subsequently used to conduct man-in-
the-middle attacks against users in Iran [20]. The same pattern had already occurred
a few months earlier when another certificate authority, Comodo, was compromised.
Both cases led to speculations about the potential involvement of state-level actors.
Such speculations have also intensified in recent years due to numerous legislative
changes made to increase the power of national intelligence agencies [8]. For instance,
concerns were raised in October 2017 about the implications of a Dutch law for trusting
the national, state-level CA of the Netherlands [7]. On the bright side, the attacks and
the controversies led to many initiatives for improving the security of the global PKI.
The current initiatives for improving TLS/PKI security are too voluminous [38] to
adequately summarize in the present context. Nevertheless—insofar as the certificate
issuance problems are considered, the standardization of the so-called certificate trans-
parency [19] is noteworthy because it enables auditing of CAs through publicly avail-
able logs. Although there is still room for improvements, the transparency logs have
also proven useful for better understanding the Internet-wide TLS/PKI ecosystem [36].
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Given the increasing concerns about the ever increasing mass surveillance [11,33], also
the so-called Let’s Encrypt (LE) initiative is worth remarking. By offering a free cer-
tificate and easy configuration options, the initiative is noteworthy as it attempts to
democratize certificate issuance by challenging both the state-led mass surveillance
endeavors and the global certificate business [1]. The initiative also supports and re-
spects certification authorization [21], which is one of the standardized initiatives for
improving TLS/PKI security. Before proceeding to discuss CAA in detail, it should
be emphasized that the rationale behind CAA is to address the first weakness type,
the erroneous issuance of certificates. This rationale is implemented through DNS by
allowing any domain name owner to restrict the issuance of certificates by CAs.
2. Certification Authority Authorization
The CAA resource record type was created to allow a domain name owner to specify
those certificate authorities who are allowed to issue certificates for the domain name.
Before issuing certificates for domains, CAs evaluate the presence of CAA records via
live DNS resolving. If the records are either missing or the records specifically autho-
rize a given CA, the certificate authority is permitted to proceed with the certificate
issuance. In essence, therefore, CAA provides an additional assertion to prevent erro-
neous or accidental issuance of certificates. This DNS-based authorization mechanism
neither addresses nor prevents threats originating from the insecurity of certificate
authorities. That is: by compromising a CA, it is presumably trivial to also bypass
CAA checking when issuing rogue certificates or conducting some related attacks.
The RFC 6844 specification [15] for CAA is fairly simple. The RR structure contains
flags, tags, and values. Currently, only the so-called critical flag is defined. Specifying
this flag instructs a CA to not issue a certificate in case the CA does not implement or
understand the semantics of a given tag-value pair. There are three valid tags: (1) the
issue tag is used to define a certificate authority who is authorized to issue certificates
for the domain in question; (2) the issuewild tag is similar but authorizes the issuance
of wildcard certificates; and (3) the iodef tag enables the use of a standardized message
exchange format [9] to report CAA-related problems to the owner of the domain. For
the issue and issuewild tags, the value specifies the CA who is authorized. An empty
value is interpreted to disallow the issuance. For instance, the following imaginary
record disallows the issuance of wildcard certificates, while permitting DigiCert to issue
normal certificates and instructing CAs to use electronic mail for reporting problems:
example.com CAA 0 issuewild ";"
example.com CAA 0 issue "digicert.com"
example.com CAA 0 iodef "mailto:root@example.com"
Despite of this simple format, many DNS servers and tools do not yet support the
CAA resource record. In addition to this lack of supporting software, the current adop-
tion challenges relate to domain name aliases, the lack of clearly defined accounting
criteria on how CAs are evaluating CAA records in practice, and configuration prob-
lems for multinational companies who may control hundreds of domains and their
subdomains [27]. While many of these problems likely continue to hinder adoption,
the question about domain name aliases is directly relevant also for this paper. In
other words, a few details about the empirical sample should be elaborated before
proceeding to evaluate the adoption of the certification authority authorization.
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3. Data
The empirical sample is based on the Alexa’s top-million busiest domains [4]. Although
some skepticism is warranted about the representativeness of the list particularly in
the DNS context [37], the list is commonly used as a benchmark in large-scale empirical
studies exploring TLS/PKI [35,36], among other Internet measurement topics [10,30].
Because the paper’s focus is restricted to DNS, a simple client-side DNS resolver [29]
was used to query for CAA resource records of each domain in the Alexa’s popularity
list using Google’s name server at 8.8.8.8. This querying requires a brief elaboration.
Each domain in the list was resolved three times in order to rule out timeouts and
other temporary resolution failures. The same applies to further resolving required to
process the CAA records from the viewpoint of certificate authorities [15]. For dealing
with aliases (CNAMEs), a generally recommended upper limit [18] is used by fixing the
maximum number of recursive queries to eight. This recursion depth is also noted in
the errata for the CAA standard [26]. As an example: if the CAA records of a domain
a.b.c are aliased to d.e.f, which in turn has a CNAME pointing to g.h.i, after two
recursive queries (for resolving d.e.f and g.h.i), the CAA records of g.h.i are used
for a.b.c, provided that these are present. If this recursive search does not find CAA
records, the records are queried by moving upward in the DNS hierarchy until the top-
level domain (TLD) name is reached [15]. For instance: if no CAA records are found by
traversing the CNAME chain of a.b.c, the CAA records of b.c, if present, are used
for the domain a.b.c. If also this hierarchical query fails, the domain a.b.c is finally
concluded to operate without CAA records, given that the subsequent hierarchical
level denotes a top-level domain to which the hierarchical querying does not traverse.
A brief semantic validation is carried out for each CAA record. Namely: (1) each
resource is verified to include a flag, a tag, and a value; (2) flags are asserted to equal
128, one, or zero; (3) tags are validated to be either issue, issuewild, or iodef ; and (4)
values specified with iodef are checked to start either with the character string mailto
or with the string http. These basic checks caught a few small errors in the specifi-
cations of the CAA records among the domains sampled. For instance, a few domains
omit the mailto, http, or https prefixes when specifying values for the iodef tag. Also
other innocent mistakes are present: the domains manned.org, thousandwonders.net,
vncg.org, and yorhel.nl have tried to specify wildcard authorizations but spelled
the corresponding tag as issuewold. Likewise, the domain globo.com has spelled the
iodef tag as ideof, and the domain hivolda.no has specified two flags. While these
few cases are statistical outliers, the cases are excluded to ensure consistent parsing.
It is worth to also remark that it would be possible to carry out further validation by
resolving also the authorized domains, including the mail exchange (MX) records for
the email addresses delivered via the iodef tag. As the focus of the paper is on the
adoption of CAA, such validation experiments can be left for further work, however.
4. Results
The dataset obtained via live DNS resolving contains 16086 domains with CAA re-
source records. Thus, in absolute terms, the adoption is still at a rather modest level:
only about 1.6% of the domains in the Alexa’s top-million list have specified certifi-
cation authority authorizations in their DNS records. Even though existing scholarly
research is limited, there are good reasons to suspect that the pace of adoption has
increased after the CAA checking was voted as mandatory for certificate authorities
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participating in the CA/Browser Forum. For instance, only 307 domains out of Alexa’s
top-million list were reported to have deployed CAA records in early April 2017 [3].
If this amount is used as a coarse heuristic, the adoption has increased by over 5000%
in about six months. To a small extent, the adoption has been slower among more
popular domains compared to less popular domains. This observation is illustrated in
Fig. 1, which shows the presence of CAA records across Alexa’s popularity rank. Al-
though com is the most frequent TLD among the sampled domains with CAA records,
also many country-code TLDs appear in the ranking shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 1. Presence of CAA Records and Alexa’s Popularity Ranks
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Figure 3. Domains Authorized
On average, most of the domains with CAA records authorize only one CA. Most
of these authorizations authorize CAs to issue only normal certificates. Authorizations
involving wildcard certificates are less common (see Fig. 3). The so-called DNS graphs
offer a good method to elaborate these observations further.
By using a common undirected and bipartite DNS graph representation [31], there
are two types of vertices: the domains sampled from the Alexa’s list and the domains
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the sampled domains have authorized via the issue or the issuewild tags. Whenever a
given “Alexa-domain” has authorized a “CA-domain”, an edge is placed between these
two types of domain vertices. A resulting graph representation is illustrated in Fig. 4
by connecting the domains sampled (as represented by the green vertices with their
sizes proportional to Alexa’s popularity ranks) to the CA-domains (as represented
by blue vertices) that the sampled Alexa-domains have authorized to issue wildcard
certificates. By constructing an analogous bipartite graph according to the issue tag,
the most frequently authorized domains can be summarized by calculating the number
of adjacent vertices to the Alexa-domains. The results from this calculation are shown
in Fig. 5. There are many relevant observations to make from these two figures.
All of the big commercial CAs are represented, but the CAA authorizations do not
entirely reflect the market shares of the CA companies [24]. Interestingly, neither are
the numerous acquisitions and other changes in the market structure (yet) reflected
in the results. What is more important, the most frequently authorized domain in the
issue graph is Google’s pki.goog. This observation does not mean that many domains
would authorize Google to issue certificates. The explanation rather is that many of
Google’s domains are popular, and, hence, present also in the Alexa’s top-million list.
A closer look reveals that out of the 8954 domains connected to pki.goog in the
issue graph, as much as 8574 contain the character string blogspot. These cases also
reflect the resolving strategy; the CAA records for most of these cases were resolved
via DNS hierarchy. In fact, out of the 16086 domains with CAA records, only three
were obtained via the CNAME traversing, about 14% were directly available, and as
much as 86% were retrieved by moving upward in the DNS hierarchy. A majority of
the hierarchical resolving cases refer to Google’s domains.
The large disconnected subgraph in Fig. 4 represents domains that have disallowed
the issuance of wildcard certificates for all authorities by specifying empty values
for their issuewild tags. Given the concerns about erroneous certificate issuance, this
observation can be seen as a positive finding. However, all of these 170 domains have
accompanied their empty issuewild tags with non-empty issue tags, meaning that the
domains have still authorized CAs to issue normal certificates. It is also noteworthy
that the amount of self-loops is only eight and fifteen in the issue and issuewild graphs,
respectively. In other words, only a few domains have authorized themselves. While
digicert.com is among these domains, most of these cases likely refer to deployments
operating with self-signed certificates.
It is interesting to observe that many of the authorized CAs tend to cluster into their
own dense subgraphs that are only sparsely connected to other clustered subgraphs.
While this observation is a typical finding in empirical graph mining applications [28],
the contextual interpretation is more interesting than statistical clustering as such. To
aid the interpretation, Fig. 7 displays six subgraphs that include those vertices and
edges that are two steps away from the labeled domains authorized via the issue tag.
The presence of dense subgraphs means that most Alexa-domains tend to only au-
thorize one CA-domain, which is understandable because most certificates cost money.
Interestingly, however, the domains that have authorized letsencrypt.org via the is-
sue tag tend to form a more dense subgraph than many of the domains that have au-
thorized commercial CAs. Even though LE is less frequently authorized than DigiCert
(see Fig. 5), for instance, this result likely again reflects the sampling from the Alexa’s
list. In other words, the most popular domains are not the primary target audience of
the LE initiative. The denseness of the LE-subgraph in Fig. 7 likely reflects this target
audience. In absolute terms, the results also implicitly correlate rather well with pre-
vious results according to which about 5% of domains in the Alexa’s top-million list
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used a LE’s certificate in late 2016 [1]. While also the earlier remark about Google’s
domains is vividly reinforced by the subgraph illustration in Fig. 7, the upper-left
subgraph is also noteworthy because it indicates the presence of a few configuration
mistakes. That is, specifying both an empty value and a specified issuer is identical to
specifying just the specified issuer alone [15]. Analogous point can be made regarding
the flags specified for authorizations; a few domains have set a value one rather than
the value 128 for specifying the critical flag (see Fig. 6). Finally, most of the domains
that have used the iodef tag prefer electronic mail for reporting CAA-related issues
(see Fig. 8). The majority of the domains with CAA records (about 65%, to be precise)
have not bothered to announce any contact details, however.
5. Conclusion
This paper surveyed the adoption of the certification authority authorization. By using
a dataset based on live DNS resolving of domains in the Alexa’s top-million list, the
adoption of CAA was observed to still be at a modest level. Among the domains that
have specified CAA records in their DNS configurations, the authorization of normal
certificates is more common than the authorization of wildcard certificates. In fact,
many domains explicit disallow CAs to issue wildcard certificates. In terms of the
authorized CAs, the results reported reflect only partially the market structure of
the global certificate business. In addition to new initiatives such as Let’s Encrypt,
particularly the domains owned by Google have pushed the adoption of CAA forward.
These results align well with the continuing concerns about weaknesses in the global
TLS/PKI ecosystem. Four limitations can be also noted for further work on CAA.
The paper’s scope was strictly restricted to DNS. Therefore, (1) further research is
required for better understanding how the DNS-based certificate authorizations cor-
relate with the actual issuance of certificates by certificate authorities. The certificate
transparency logs provide a good empirical source to examine such correlations. The
topic is important because CAA does not impose any technique for validating whether
a CA is properly evaluating CAA resource records [27]. Likewise, the use of DNS se-
curity (DNSSEC) is strongly recommended to be used in conjunction with CAA [15].
Although this conjunction was not examined in this paper, (2) it should be addressed
in further empirical research. Nor did the paper attempt to track the adoption across
time. Given that CAA checking was recently voted to be mandatory for most cer-
tificate authorities, (3) further research is also needed to systematically track CAA’s
future longitudinal evolution in different areas. For instance, an interesting topical
area relates to the future adoption of CAA among content delivery networks and their
DNS infrastructures. Finally, the sample used in the paper was restricted to the most
popular domains. As this restriction presumably entails some biases for observing
new TLS/PKI openings such as LE, (4) further work is required to evaluate different
sampling strategies for large-scale empirical Internet measurement experiments.
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